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DECENT AND INDECENT PROPOSALS IN THE LAW:
REFLECTIONS ON OPENING THE CONTRACTS
DISCOURSE TO INCLUDE OUTSIDERS
By BEVERLY HORSBURGH*
Recently the students at my law school revised the question-
naire used to evaluate professors at the end of the term. The
format was changed so that the data can be more efficiently
stored and expeditiously retrieved. Because computerized infor-
mation can be swiftly located and tabulated, lightening what was
in the past a heavy administrative burden, the new evaluation
form strikes terror in the hearts of all nontenured professors.
Those committed to minority interests have especially good rea-
sons for alarm. On the form, students respond to the following
questions:
1. Were the students treated fairly and impartially without
regard to the professor's personal biases?
2. Did the professor's personal idiosyncracies significantly
detract from the course?
3. Would you like to see this professor retained at the school?
I worry about some of the evaluations I will receive because
of an incident that occurred in my classroom. In response to the
traditional "Who Sued Whom?" a student told me, "A colored
guy petitioned for custody of a child." I hope I handled the
situation properly when I suggested the appropriate form of
address was African American or black. The student began again
and reiterated "This colored guy...." I again asked that she use
different words. The entire class fell into an uncomfortable si-
lence. No one gasped or indicated by words or gesture any
disapproval of the student's reading of the case. Student solidar-
ity against the professor as prosecutor or persecutor was in the
air. The small number of black students in the class put their
heads down and became engrossed in their notes. The student
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law. B.A., Smith
College; J.D., University of Miami School of Law.
I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Peter Margulies and Professor Naomi
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started over and this time with great animosity repeated "A
colored guy...." I interrupted for a third time. At this point I
stopped trying to discuss the case and did the unthinkable. I
lectured on sensitivity and insisted on politically correct speech.'
No doubt my evaluations (I hope just a handful) will inform
me that my personal idiosyncracies and biases interfere with the
course.2 I also suspect they will tell me that I am not always fair
and do not treat all of my students with respect. For some
students, my insistence that the class adhere to what is perceived
as Professor Horsburgh's personal choice of words is an indecent
proposal, exactly the sort of stuff to be criticized on the ques-
tionnaire. From my point of view, however, an indecent proposal
underlies and animates the questionnaire. The evaluation form
presupposes that professors have an obligation to be impartial,
1. 1 discussed the incident at the recent conference of the Society of American Law
School Teachers (SALT). Some of the professors in my workshop suggested it is more
appropriate for a teacher to call on other students to correct a classmate rather than to
personally become involved in the situation. Others agreed with my approach, insisting
that professors are role models and must take responsibility for ensuring all in the class
are treated with respect. They maintained that it is unfair to expect students to assume
the professor's job. Another group perceptively observed that some professors, in partic-
ular, white women, black men and women, and Asian Americans, for example, are more
likely to incur hostility and rebellion in the classroom than white male professors who
are easily accepted as authority figures. As for me, I was so shocked and unbalanced by
the student's statements that I reacted the way I would to anyone, be it student,
professor, or social acquaintance.
I also believe there is all the difference in the world between "colored person" and
"person of color," although seemingly the change is stylistic. Language is a system of
signs produced and interpreted within a culture. As such, a social group is defined
through the use of certain words or phrases that are encoded with the values of the
culture from which the words are derived. In this case, "colored person" signifies the
white culture's classification of African Americans and evokes images of slavery. In
contrast, "person of color" is a form of words a people have chosen for themselves. It
expresses dignity and pride. But see ROBERT HUGHES, CULTURE OF COMPLAINT: THE FRAYING
OF AMERICA 20-21 (1993) (claiming racism is unaffected by the use of either phrase and
criticizing the emphasis on politically correct speaking habits).
2. Student evaluations tend to reward professors who are traditionalists and to be
hostile to professors who are concerned with racism or feminism, who espouse critical
legal studies, or who are libertarians. See Richard L. Abel, Evaluating Evaluations: How
Should Law Schools Judge Teaching?, 40 J. LEGAL EDuc. 407, 426 (1990). Abel attributes
low ratings to a student's disagreements with a professor's politics and values. Id. at
439. See also Robin D. Barnes, Black Women Law Professors and Critical Self-Consciousness:
A Tribute to Professor Denise S. Carty-Bennia, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 66 n.23
(1991) (commenting that teaching evaluations provide students with the opportunity ta
ventilate their antagonism to race and gender issues).
Although many studies find no correlation between gender and a student's evaluation
of teaching, some have proven women professors receive lower ratings than men. See,
e.g., Susan A. Basow & Nancy T. Silberg, Student Evaluations of College Professors: Are
Female and Male Professors Rated Differently?, 79 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 308 (1987).
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that one interpretive method should be taught, and that rules of
law are objective, principled, and apolitical.
Nonetheless, I believe the system that is touted as neutral and
normative reflects the politics of the dominant culture. A partial
and subjective view is presented as universal, setting the content,
tone, and methodology of the educational process. Although
outsiders3 challenge the stance of the dominant discourse, the
core assumption of objectivity embedded in the tradition ensures
that diversity is kept in its place. Furthermore, the traditional
law school tends to institutionalize patriarchy, homophobia, and
racism. For example, when women's issues are confined to an
upper level course or seminar instead of included in context in
every course, a school marginalizes women and enshrines a sep-
arate spheres philosophy.4 A course on AIDS is usually similarly
misplaced. When black defendants are found in criminal courses,
but not in contracts or property, a teaching institution perpetu-
ates segregation and racist stereotyping. When family law and
poverty law are downgraded as optional courses, and considered
only policy-oriented also-rans, whereas commercial law and cor-
porate law are promoted as analytically rigorous necessities, a
school creates a value hierarchy and politicizes the curriculum.
Thus, notwithstanding the efforts of professors who attempt
to open the discourse and provide neutralizers or antidotes to
the parochial nature of the pedagogy, the debate has already
been circumscribed. By implying that the legal discourse is ob-
jective, and that it becomes skewed only because of an individual
professor's views, the evaluation form further entrenches biases
and increases the difficulties professors encounter in unpacking
racist and sexist assumptions in the law. It also enlists students
to use their power to ensure the continuation of the status quo.
In fact, in light of the traditional law school's pro forma commit-
ment to diversity, what happened in my classroom is a predictable
3. Professor Mari Matsuda coined the term 'outsider" to designate a social group
whose perspective is not recognized by the dominant culture. "Outsider" suggests that
minority status is not just a question of a social group's actual number count. See Mari
J. Matsuda, Public Re.ponses to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH.
L. REv. 2320, 2323 n.15 (1989).
4. Feminists have noted the tendency to divide and separate the social world into
private and public spheres, associating women with the personal, domestic side of life
and men with the publicly regulated world of commercial transactions. See, e.g., Frances
E. Olsen, The Family and the Market.: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1497 (1983). Law schools reinforce social divisions by isolating gender issues from
the rest of the curriculum and setting them apart from the concerns of lawyers.
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event. The student revealed the prejudice that a school overtly
condemns, but imperceptibly implements.
Maintaining a neutral stance in the classroom may also be
interpreted as indifference, encouraging students to see them-
selves merely as hired guns. On the other hand, undertaking a
commitment, assuming moral responsibility for one's acts as a
lawyer, and becoming emotionally engaged in one's work, are
devalued attitudes. Good lawyering is equated with the ability
to disengage oneself from one's argument. A law school inflicts
split personalities in defining success as excelling off brief. No
wonder a student sees herself as deficient if she is unable to
dispossess herself by cleaving her self-identity from her self-
expression. No wonder minority students come to see their con-
cerns as special interests evidencing their own inability. Instead
of pressing for the impossible or the impracticable, surely a
school should be helping students to a better understanding of
themselves. Enabling students to use their own sense of self-
identity in their work can bring out the best that is in them.
Hence, the evaluation form represents more than just a per-
sonal risk for the oddball, nontraditionalist professor. It also
implicates a teaching institution's epistemology, values, and a
power structure that involves students as well as professors. For
me, the questions are inappropriate in a community of scholars
and students who together should be able to question the law as
well as the social arrangements that the doctrine reflects and
engenders.
Despite the drawbacks in any given evaluation form and many
law schools' curricula, I must confess that the drama that unfolded
in my classroom suggests there was something wrong with what
I was doing as a professor. Merely slipping a case into the
traditional discipline in which a plaintiff is a member of a minority
does not eliminate prejudice or broaden a course's scope of vision,
let alone transform legal education. It can even lead to a backlash.
Opening a course to diversity is more than a numbers game. The
outsider's point of view should also be included to instill sensi-
tivity. Because there are multiple disparate minority voices as
well as many disagreements on approaches and solutions to
outsider problems,5 any attempt to meaningfully attain diversity
5. For example, scholars are not in accord over the degree to which traditional rights
analysis and the civil rights struggle have benefitted the black community. They also
maintain different positions on the value of critical legal studies to minorities. See
KimberI6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Le-
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can become entangled in a contradictory jurisprudence. As a
result, I have experimented in my contracts course, drawing on
various theories. I have learned that my success or failure is
related to the degree to which a particular legal theory achieves
its goals. I therefore replay in the classroom the existing debate
between theorists, and contracts becomes a mix of decent and
indecent proposals.
In this article I critique various avenues to diversity, including
theories of formal equal rights, feminist and critical race ap-
proaches, and critical legal studies. Although these methodologies
allow other voices to be heard in the classroom, I have come to
believe they are also traps into which we all fall at times. I point
out the ways in which these theories insufficiently address the
project of including outsiders in contract law. I conclude that the
shortcomings in jurisprudence, however, are not responsible for
all the problems encountered in attempting to embrace a more
inclusive discourse. As long as prejudice remains a part of the
organizing thought structure of a law school education, the di-
versity project is limited at best. A change in the legal culture's
attitude and more substantive alterations in the curriculum are
needed in order to achieve a truly diverse law school education.
Ir my attempts to achieve the goal of diversity, I am mindful
of the current intellectual climate, in which the writings and the
efforts of nontraditional professors to include outsiders have been
met with a degree of hostility that I believe is all out of propor-
tion to any potential threat they pose. I am concerned that the
backlash in legal education will lead to a suppression of nontra-
ditionalist thought and that censorship looms in the future. In
particular, I am troubled, as are many in academia, by the vicious
gitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331 (1988) (faulting critical
legal studies for not addressing society's pervasive race consciousness, which perpetuates
the subordination of blacks despite formal reform, and arguing that the black community
must "assert a collective identity" in order to change its political reality); Richard Delgado,
The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 301 (1987) (arguing that critical legal studies scholars who advocate
eliminating formal societal structures that curb racism are misguided); Alan Freeman,
Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 295 (1988) (concluding that transcending racial boundaries, rather
than forming individual coalitions, is the key to making equality of opportunity a reality
instead of a formalistic ideology). Feminists also express different perspectives on gender
issues. For a comprehensive survey of feminist methodologies, see Katharine T. Bartlett,
Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REv. 829 (1990). An overview of the intellectual
landscape in legal thought today can be found in Gary Minda, Jurisprudence at Century's
End, 43 J. LEGAL EDuc. 27 (1993).
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attack on Professor Catharine MacKinnon in a recent article6 and
the cruel parody of the late Professor Mary Joe Frug written
by members of a law review.? Of course, no professor is above
peer criticism and students usually are entitled to poke fun at
their tormenters. Nonetheless, the accusations leveled at Profes-
sor MacKinnon and other feminists are not the usual disagree-
ments over legal theory between mutually respectful colleagues.6
6. Kenneth Lasson, Feminism Awry: Excesses in the Pursuit of Rights and Trifles,
42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 17 (1992).
7. Even though Professor Frug had been murdered, student editors of Harvard Law
Review wrote and distributed a satire deriding Professor Frug and her contributions to
feminist theory. The editors called her the "Rigor-Mortis Professor of Law." Some believe
the incident revealed the underlying hostility to women and feminist thought in the
typical law school environment. For an accounting on what occurred at Harvard Law
School concerning Professor Mary Joe Frug, see Jack Evans, The Gender Agenda: Is
Feminism Welcome on Law School Campuses?, STUDENT LAW., Nov. 1992, at 34.
8. For example, the following is a particularly caustic criticism of feminist studies:
Perhaps the most self-destructive characteristic of radical feminist scholar-
ship is its long-winded pretentiousness, a kind of catalytic clack that has
become a classic part of the process toward intellectual decay. In their
philosophical pursuit of answers to ultimate questions, the radfems get mired
in the multisyllabic muck of overintellectualization, lacing their ideas with
obscure cross-references and mind-numbing bombast, ultimately turning words
into meaningless twaddle. The burning bra has become a boombox of babble.
Lasson, supra note 6, at 24.
In fact, despite the sophistication and depth of thought in nontraditional scholarship,
the writings of outsiders are misunderstood, distorted, and trivialized by many in the
legal academy. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 1745, 1807-08 (1989) (claiming critical race theorists attempt to generate feelings
of guilt in the white majority in order to justify a lowering of academic standards).
Outsider scholars often find it necessary to respond to their marginalization. See DERRICK
BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 142-46 (1992);
Marina Angel, Women in Legal Education: What It's Like to Be Part of a Perpetual First
Wave or the Case of the Disappearing Women, 61 -TEMPLE L.Q. 799, 833 (1988); Patricia
Cain, Feminist Legal Scholarship, 77 IOWA L. REV. 19, 30-32 (1991); Mary Coombs, Outsider
Scholarship: The Law Review Stories, 63 U. CoLo. L. REV. 683, 691 (1992); Richard Delgado,
The Imperial Scholar Revisited. How to Marginalize Outsider Writing, Ten Years Later,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1356-60 (1992); see also Regina Austin, Saphire Bound, 1989 Wis.
L. REV. 539, 541 (reminding us that there is little in the case law or commentary that is
helpful to someone writing on the legal problems of black women).
Outsider professors, moreover, continue to experience difficulty in being hired, often
resign their positions, and are frequently denied tenure. See Abel, supra note 2, at 409-
10; Angel, supra-at 823-24 (relating her own experience), 830-34 (condemning the criteria
for tenure at most law schools as downright hostile to women and favoring the "boys"
who lunch together, discussing the physical attributes of their women students); see also
Richard Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on American Law
School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 537, 538-39, 539 n.11 (1988) (documenting that in the
1986-87 academic year black professors constituted 3.7% of majority-operated law school
faculties and that most women teachers were cloistered in non-tenure track legal writing
departments); Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal
Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705 (arguing scholarly opportunity is controlled by power and
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Furthermore, if law students lack the simple human decency
to refrain from callously ridiculing a professor who was violently
murdered, and are unable to compassionately consider the feel-
ings of her family and friends, the traditional law school may not
be doing its job. Characterizing a personal attack on Professor
Frug's values and character as only invoking issues of free
speech9 descends to a level of utter indifference to others and to
a degree of moral relativism that leaves me breathless. Quite
possibly there is a need for academia to submit itself to some
self-criticisms. Quite possibly an ongoing series of lectures, work-
shops, and retreats in which both faculty and students become
more educated on diversity issues could sensitize the academic
community and improve the quality of life for all. In any case, a
little self-conscious awareness that what is usually presented in
class insufficiently addresses the concerns of outsiders will not
destroy the citadel. Accordingly, I write in hopes it will do some
good, alleviate some fears, and in some small way be considered
a rebuttal to the assaults on my colleagues. All of the stories I
recount occurred in my classroom or were told to me by my
students or other professors. I thank them for their confidences
and in this article strive to give voice to their concerns.
I. THE LIBERAL PROPOSAL
The first approach to diversity in contracts is similar to the-
ories of formal equal rights ° in that outsiders are granted nominal
that legal academia is not a meritocracy); Carl Tobias, Engendering Law Faculties, 44 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1143, 1149-50 (1990) (condemning the stated or unstated tenure criteria of
collegiality because it handicaps many women who do not comfortably fit in with the
men that compose the tenured faculty and make most of the tenure decisions); Carl
Tobias, Respect for Diversity: The Case of Feminist Legal Thought, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 175
(1989) (criticizing the general lack of respect for feminists in academia and the reluctance
to tenure feminist scholars). See generally Stephanie M. Wildman, Integration in the 1980s:
The Dream of Diversity and the Cycle of Exclusion, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1625 (1990) (using
narratives to illustrate the difficulty of eliminating discrimination in hiring practices).
Although some outsider professors achieve tenure, measuring their success according to
the number tenured can be deceptive in that a statistically significant percentage leave
before tenure consideration. See Report of the AALS Special Committee on Tenure and the
Learning Process, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 477, 485-86 (1992). Some in legal education believe
outsider professors should quit the premises altogether and be drummed out of the
academic corps. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC.
222, 227 (1984) (suggesting critical legal studies scholars have an ethical duty to leave
academia).
9. See Fox Butterfield, Parody Puts Harvard Law Faculty in Sexism Battle, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 27, 1992, at A10 (quoting Professor Alan Dershowitz who described the
outcry over the parody as evidence that radicals cannot accept the free speech rights of
those who disagree with them).
10. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 228-32 (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
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representation without a recognition of differences. Reflecting
traditional liberal thought11 and unaffected *by the insights in
feminism or critical race scholarship, a standard contracts sylla-
bus is presented to students. The well-intended liberal professor,
however, believes his course is diversified because occasionally
he varies his pronouns or uses gender neutral language. Now
and again' he includes minorities in typical contract hypotheticals.
Although the good liberal formalist may acknowledge minority
presence in market transactions by naming Mr. Martinez the
offeror and Mr. Chan the offeree or help to dislodge notions of
gendered spaces by inventing a problem involving an employer
named Ms. Jones, these are imaginary scenarios, at odds with
the predominance of white males accurately reflected in contracts
case law. Hypotheticals can present an unrealistic socioeconomic
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 115-18 (1977). Dworkin speaks of law as the continuous expression of
formal abstract principles that the ideal judge or Hercules discovers in past legal decisions.
A new chapter on law must coherently fit within these past decisions. The judge's
interpretation of history becomes the measure of one's rights. Although Dworkin attempts
to develop universal abstract rights, many outsiders believe his approach only reflects
the viewpoint of a white middle-class male intellectual. Dworkin has been criticized for
proposing an atomistic individualistic political philosophy and for emphasizing rights as
more important than civic responsibilities. See Robin West, Foreword: Taking Freedom
Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 46-47, 71-72 (1990) (attacking rights analysis because it
insulates the holder of rights from public scrutiny and neglects our ability to understand
another's subjective experiences). Margaret Radin claims Dworkin's ideal judge cannot
step outside existing legal institutions to achieve a broader viewpoint and is unable to
consider the perspective of the oppressed. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and
the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1725 (1990).
11. In using the term liberalism, I refer to the overall structuring and analysis of the
social world in mainstream legal thought, including legal definitions and classifications,
law's psychology of human behavior, and the thrust of legal argumentation. Liberalism
or liberal legalism, the phrase used by some scholars, has a broader meaning than is
ordinarily meant by the word "liberal" and encompasses the mainstream, the schools of
thought of both liberals and conservatives. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES 2-3 (1987). According to critical legal scholars, the thought structures of
liberal legalism are composed of three sets of mutually contradictory arguments. The
particular rhetoric chosen to resolve any legal question is indeterminate because the
opposite argument could just as easily have been selected. First, a contradiction exists
between our need for the security of bright-line arbitrary rules versus the justice of
factually sensitive standards. Second, our belief in subjective values, self-determined in
a free society, contradicts our faith in recognizing objective ethical precepts. Third, a
contradiction exists between individualism, the notion that expressions of free choice are
entitled to respect, and functionalism, the notion that preferences should be disregarded
as the product of coercive social forces or insufficient information. Most importantly,
critical legal studies adherents claim that one side of each set is privileged over the
other. Usually, the preferred mode of legal argument that settles an issue consists of a
defense of rules, a dependence on subjective values or an insistence on the importance
of individualism. Id. at 3-4. See also Richard Michael Fischl, The Question That Killed
Critical Legal Studies, 17 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 779, 785 (1992).
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picture and privilege the problems of the white middle class.
Contract law historically developed in response to the special
needs of an expanding middle class of mercantile actors.12 As
such, the rules and standards promote the growth of commercial
transactions by favoring customary commercial practices, honor-
ing established business expectations, and protecting against the
risks of the typical merchant: the unforeseen rise or fall in prices
of goods in a free market economy. In short, contract law com-
prises the interests of those securely entrenched in society.13
Contract law does not concern itself with the history of women
or African Americans becoming a part of this country's business
enterprise. The efforts of outsiders to gain admission and find a
place in the commercial world are obscured in this approach to
diversity.
Additionally, when a professor fails to recognize differences,
she compels an outsider student to deny her sense of group
identity and aspects of her distinct individuality. For instance,
consider how Jewish students may feel if their unique heritage
is ignored. In many first-year contracts classrooms, students'
introduction to the law entails learning to enforce contracts made
in Nazi-controlled Europe.14 Understanding the rules of a bargain
exchange, that courts will not question its fairness, requires them
to stifle their identification with the Jews who fled from Nazi
persecution, selling homes and possessions for whatever amounts
they could obtain.
Likewise, women students must inhabit the neutered, disem-
bodied minds of reasonable commercial actors, oblivious to their
female biology and genderized social reality. Because of the dual
burden of raising children as well as maintaining a job, few
women in the business world achieve the same success as men.
Yet, contract case books ignore women's situation. Commercial
12. See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-
1860 (1977) (proposing that the 19th century theory of contract evolved to suit the
interests of the emerging middle-class of commercial entrepreneurs); Jay M. Feinman &
Peter Gabel, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
373 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990) (arguing both classical and contemporary contract
law generate ideological images of freedom and equality that mask and legitimate
oppressive commercial practices).
13. See HORWITZ, supra note 12, at 208-11; Feinman & Gabel, supra note 12, at 381-
382.
14. See Batsakis v. Demotsis, 226 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) (upholding an
agreement in which a woman who was attempting to flee from Greece in 1942 agreed to
pay $2,000 in order to receive $25 worth of Greek drachmas).
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actors are childless, nonpregnant persons unhampered by family
responsibilities. 15
A similarly distressing situation exists for African American
students. Imagine the possible emotions of black students who
are expected to identify with the buyer and the seller of cotton
when class discussion centers on whether there is an agreement
if both parties attach different meanings to the same word. 6 The
students may be affected by what is not being mentioned, re-
membering that the entire cotton trade was bottomed on the
institution of slavery. 7 Given that African labor furthered com-
merce and increased the wealth of the merchant class, and the
very rules that are studied in contracts protected those who
benefitted from African subjugation, the struggle of African
Americans to become more than just the subject matter of an
agreement should now be emphasized in any course on contract
law.
Hypotheticals that essentialize all individuals into the proto-
typical offeror or offeree eliminate the significance of differences
and the ways in which differences have been socially constructed
into handicaps. If color and gender, as well as an individual's
socioeconomic situation, are not recognized and brought into the
contracts discourse as substantial barriers that interfere with
the exercise of bargaining power, diversity becomes a masquer-
ade. The prototypical minority offeror who is not encumbered
with the social disadvantages of race, gender, or both, is only a
male dressed in a skirt or a white donning black face. Nominal
inclusion approaches mislead students into thinking that everyone
faces the same transactional problems and that these problems
are unrelated to minority status. In using this strategy to include
minorities, a professor could desensitize students from appreci-
15. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, S 102(a)(1), 107 Stat.
6. 9 (1993) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. S 2612). Unfortunately, the Act does not require
that the leave be paid. See id. S 102(c)(d), 107 Stat. 6, 10. In addition, it excludes those
employers with fewer than 50 employees. See id. S 101(4XA}i), 107 Stat. 6, 8.
16. See Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864) (holding that there is no
contract if the buyer intends one ship named "Peerless" while the seller intends another
with the same name).
17. Grant Gilmore speculates that the price of cotton fell at the time of the Rqa.es
decision. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 36, 120 n.87 (1974). When Union forces
captured the city of New Orleans, the Lincoln administration confiscated the Confederate
bales of cotton at the port and sold them abroad. Id. Quite possibly American cotton
could be sold more cheaply in England than the cotton from Bombay onboard the second
ship "Peerless." Id.
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ating the difference that differences make' s in a sexualized, co-
lorized world.
In addition, the liberal formalist tends to discuss rules of law
in isolation, unrelated to the political, intellectual, and social
history from which they were derived. 19 Doctrine is portrayed
not as the particular ideology of a specific culture, but as an
unfiltered depiction of the truth, and as a result, students receive
an unrealistic partial picture of the relationship between law and
society. Although the liberal formalist makes students aware of
some of the social consequences of law, policy discussions are
seldom a serious concentration. The law's impact on intimate
social relationships and personal choices is not acknowledged. 0
Instead, the social is trivialized as insufficiently "analytical" and
less demanding than legal analysis.2 1 Moreover, the converse is
not always suggested-that society may affect law and the many
cultural norms structured into legal analysis.22
18. See Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279,
1323-35 (1987) (arguing that equality means recognizing "the difference that differences
make" by ensuring that differences are costless).
19. For example, discussing Raffles and concentrating only on the rules governing the
formation of contract without reference to the importance of the cotton trade, the
institution of slavery, or the effect of the Civil War on the price of cotton unanchors law
and removes it from its historical, social, and economic contexts. See supra note 16.
Similarly, Karl Klare uses the term "legal consciousness," meaning "the vision of law
and of the world characteristic of the legal profession (or of a particular elite or other
subgroup within it) at a given moment in history." Karl Klare, Contracts Jurisprudence
and the First-Year Casebook, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 876, 876 n.2 (1979) (reviewing CHARLES L.
KNAPP, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1976)). Grounding law in an
epochal moment allows us to become conscious of lawmaking as a continuous process of
defining and redefining our values and our politics, as well as our cultural and intellectual
attitudes.
20. See Nancy Ehrenreich, Surrogacy as Resistance? The Misplaced Focus n Choice in
the Surrogacy and Abortion Funding Contexts, 41 DEPAuL L. REV. 1369, 1392 (1992)
(reviewing CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY (1989)) (claiming
surrogacy and abortion decisions are not free choices but reflect the consequences of
limited economic options and stringent governmental regulations); Frances E. Olsen, The
Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 835, 837, 842-46 (1985t
(arguing that the state acts to reinforce hierarchy within the family and that legal
intervention or nonintervention is an incoherent methodology unable to resolve family
law issues).
21. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS
OF LAW, supra note 12, at 43 (pointing out that the traditional law school education
perpetuates this hierarchy by convincing students that legal reasoning is different from
and more important than policy analysis).
22. See Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE
L.J. 997, 1017, 1098 (1985) (noting that courts assume there is no contract between parties
in personal relationships because of existing societal norms, although the same behavior
is considered evidence of an implied contract outside the family setting).
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Under the liberalist formalist approach, students are not suf-
ficiently informed of the ways in which law's conceptualization
process limits the understanding and resolution of social prob-
lems. They are allowed to overlook the complex interplay be-
tween law and society. Students, thus, can be led to assume that
law exists separated and distanced from the culture in which it
is situated. Students can also come to believe that it is possible
to achieve total objectivity, and that they must cast aside their
own perspective, discovering the law from a far distant, nonex-
istant place. Students do not see law as operating within the
context of a given culture, defining and reflecting a specific
culture's self-expression.
The good liberal formalist also instills a belief in objectivity
by addressing the doctrine without indicating a preference for
any particular approach or party to the dispute.2 He seems to
represent all perspectives, impressing on the class that objectiv-
ity is possible. Exams and problems compel detachment in order
to encourage the student to represent each party and to argue
against both sides. Students must rise above their own subjective
personal response to case law and value analysis for its own
sake, as an impartial methodology that applies to many different
individuals and multiple variations of the facts. Students see
contractual analysis as an objective process, not as a forceful tool
that can predetermine results. There are benefits in appearing
to be impartial. For example, students need not be concerned
about disagreeing with a professor and may feel more free to air
their views. A stance of objectivity, however, also teaches stu-
dents to disregard the particular outcome in an individual case,
even if it seems unjust. They learn they should not become
embroiled in the interests of either the plaintiff or the defendant,
not care about the result, or be sympathetic to the individual
human beings involved. Of course, at times I too need to be the
good liberal professor and objectively emphasize doctrinal anal-
23. I have always been grateful to one of my former professors who did not hesitate
to express his personal response to law. I remember a particularly offensive case
concerning a Jewish refugee who escaped from Nazi Germany and pressed a claim against
his former employer for breach of contract in the New York court system. The employee
was fired because he was a Jew. See Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 14
N.E.2d 798 (N.Y. 1938). After discussing the doctrine, the professor asked the class if we
agreed with the New York court's refusal to entertain the claim. He then emotionally
expressed his disapproval. As a member of the Jewish post-Holocaust generation who
lost many relatives in Europe, I remember every word he said and the positive impression
he conveyed. The holding in the case is long forgotten, but not the professor's willingness
to reveal his values.
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ysis. Nevertheless, the approach is inappropriate at times because
the human dimension is lost.
When objectivity floats around the law school atmosphere, a
student quickly becomes converted into an intoxicated believer.
She has been indoctrinated into a cult, the Cult of True Objec-
tivity, and she places her faith in those who espouse this approach
to the law. If she follows the Path of Enlightenment, she too will
reach True Understanding, past her own imperfect subjective
awareness of reality. She succumbs to the professor's interpretive
stance, assuming that if she should give in to her perception of
injustice or bias24 she would be derailed from the Path to Truth.
Yet there is no Path or Way enabling anyone to distance
herself from her situation in the world. We are constituted by
our social interactions, cultural/socioeconomic background, and
the language of law.2 Such a stance, nonexistant and without
perspective, is neither realizable nor meaningful. Our very thought
structures are the product of our situation. Attempts to separate
one's thoughts from the culture in which thoughts arise yield
self-reflective images. We see ourselves when we gaze in the
pond. Because I am a white woman, Jewish, and a mother, my
reflection differs from yours. In other words, to the grave-digger,
Hamlet is the story of a grave-digger who encountered a prince.
An example of the partiality of the liberal perspective, as well
as the pressure on students to close their minds and orient
themselves to one uniform approach, occurred in my contracts
class. A woman student unsuccessfully attempted to convince her
classmates that there is no contract between the parties in Hamer
v. Sidway,2 6 and that the case is all about family and the unsel-
fishness of love. She insisted, against considerable opposition,
that the story Hamer tells concerns an uncle who cared about
his nephew and tried to prevent him from leading a self-destruc-
tive lifestyle and squandering money. Notwithstanding my re-
sponse that the student's reading was insightful, and that some
24. For example, students are instructed in contracts to deny their common sense
and believe that the most obvious barriers to understanding, little education and inability
to read and write, are not capacity issues. See, e.g., St. Landry Loan Co. v. Avie, 147 So.
2d 725 (La. Ct. App. 1962) (holding liable an illiterate French-speaking black man who
claimed he did not understand the contents of a loan agreement he signed).
25. See Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern, Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft),
105 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1.946-50 (1992) (defining identity in postmodern terms as "decen-
tered," "polymorphous," and "contingent," as well as criticizing the ways in which the
law constructs images of a woman's identity).
26. 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891) (enforcing an uncle's promise to pay his nephew $5,000 if
he abstained from gambling, drinking, and smoking until the age of 21).
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feminists would agree with her approach to the case,-7 the ma-
jority of students argued that Hamer holds that a detriment to
the promisee or a benefit to the promisor constitutes valid
consideration. Understandably, the student conceded she was
wrong and recanted, accepting canonical authority.
Both Stewart Macaulay28 and Clare Dalton,29 however, suggest
other interpretations of Hamer different from the classical wis-
dom and the view of the woman student in my class. All are
equally valid interpretive constructs, yet the good liberal profes-
sor may insist only one is the Truth, only one will gain points
on an exam. Learning law is thereby made more difficult because
a student's understanding is conditioned on her ability to shutter
her mind and accept the one aspect of reality that liberalism
projects as objective. I found it sad when that very same student,
in her third year of law school, assured me she has learned to
think like a lawyer and has a "better" grasp of legal analysis. I
suspect she has lost self-confidence, learned to deny her own
perceptions, and come to assume her sense of the world is false.
She now accepts that there is only one intelligible method to
divine the correct legal solution. This student has been taught
by students as well as professors to distrust her own reactions,
reject her own truths, and suppress her creative ability.
27. A cultural feminist would similarly analyze Hamer. Cultural feminism claims that
caring and responsibility are more important values than individual rights or contractual
obligations. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); Carrie Menkel-
.Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on d Women's Lawyering Process, 1
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985). Robin West would also support the student's reading.
She argues that a woman's understanding of the social world is informed by her
experiencing a sense of self in connection to others, as opposed to a man's sense of self
in separation from others. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1.
3 (1988).
The student happened to be a black woman. I raise this point because Robin West
has been criticized for privileging white women's experiences over the experiences of
black women. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581, 603 (1990). Although theories of an intrinsic female self are questionable
and significant differences exist between black women and white women, a black woman
raised in a middle-class traditional family at times may reflect the same values and
thought structures as a white woman who is similarly situated. Hence, any definition of
black women as essentially different from white women risks the danger of being an
overbroad generalization.
28. In his new casebook's table of contents, Professor Macaulay classifies Hamer under
the category of "Promises by a family member with money to influence the lives of those
without it." STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 3 (1993).
29. See Dalton, supra note 22, at 1088-89 n.402 (recasting Hamer as a detrimental
reliance case to illustrate the incoherence in contract analysis and arguing it is. not
possible to meaningfully distinguish between fact patterns in which there is consideration
but the facts implicate only reliance).
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II. THE ASSIMILATIONIST PROPOSAL
The second approach to diversity, the assimilationist proposal,
hardly differs from the first because it is based on the liberal
feminist view that although women should not be granted "spe-
cial" rights, the differences between men and women should be
minimally accommodated under certain circumstances. 30 Even
though room is made for women, the legal analysis and subject
matter of contracts remain untouched, reflecting the notion that
women are the same as men and should be afforded the same
treatment. By adhering to standards that evolved to suit the
interests of white men, liberal feminism duplicates traditional
liberalism's errors of omission. It conceals racist, sexist, and class-
based social practices. The theory is inadequately tuned to the
many problems of outsiders.
For example, formulating a contracts problem in which a white
woman is the vice-president of a corporation or the manager of
a football team subtly emphasizes women's competence to com-
pete with men in the workplace. Nonetheless, this flattering
image of women avoids an ugly truth. The domestic responsibil-
ities of affluent white women are often transplanted onto the
shoulders of minority women who clean their homes and care for
their children.31 Additionally, celebrating women as equal to men
could deceive students by painting rosy pictures of an ideal world,
causing them to assume that equality actually exists.
The experience of another contracts professor provides a com-
pelling example of how this result could occur. The professor
was roundly criticized for being sexist by some of his women
30. See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 26 (1985) (arguing that pregnancy should be accommodated in
the workplace because it is only a temporary episodic condition in which women differ
from men); Nadine Taub & Wendy W. Williams, Will Equality Require More Than
Assimilation, Accommodation or Separation from the Existing Social Structure?, 37 RUT-
GERS L. REV. 825, 832-36 (1985) (arguing that a dual system of sex-based rights preserves
hierarchy and that gender neutrality mandates that men and women be treated the same
unless there is a disproportionate impact on women).
31. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 154 n.35. The recent search for a qualified woman to serve
as U.S. Attorney General unearthed a common social practice, that women frequently
hire domestic workers who are illegal immigrants and are unable to find better paying
jobs. It was hardly a surprise that the successful woman nominee for the position of
Attorney General was able to meet a male profile-someone unburdened with child care
or housework. See Carol Kleiman, Nannygate Calls Up Good Old Days, CH. TRM., June
10, 1993, at N3.
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students because he called on a woman to discuss a case involving
a dispute over kosher cooking oil.32 Although it was appropriate
for the women to point out that cooking and housework should
not be genderized in the classroom, calling on male students to
avoid traditional gender stereotyping does not comport with the
real world in which men seldom assume domestic responsibili-
ties.33 Eliminating gender from the discussion can lead to de-
creased awareness of women's problems and the omission of
gender issues that should be brought to the attention of the
class. If anything, both male and female students need to become
even more aware of gender. A contracts course should inform
them that housework tends to be devalued by the courts and
that women receive little in the way of compensation for their
domestic services.34 Thus, a gender equality approach can blind
the class to the oppressive reality of genderized social roles by
overlooking concerns that are critical to women.
Furthermore, the assimilationist proposal does not eliminate
the flaws in contract methodology. The conceptual structure of
contract tends to objectify women. To illustrate, consider the
issues in my exams (which are probably fairly representative) in
which students are expected to argue that a surrogate mother
should be sued for breach of warranty or that a woman can claim
recovery in quantum meruit from her former lover. In testing
my students' knowledge of the fundamentals of contract, I also
teach them to commodify women. If a woman is identified as a
surrogate, she is envisioned as nothing more than a babymaker
whose body is the vehicle of another's interests.3 5 As a professor,
I sanction the exploitative instrumental usage of women and
restore the patriarchal world that I, as a feminist, attempt to
dismantle.
32. Parev Prod. Co. v. I. Rokeach & Sons, 124 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1941).
33. Traditional cultural attitudes continue to influence the allocation of work within
the home. Although many women hold jobs, they still take on the burden of housework
and childcare. See ARLIE HOCHSCHILD & ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING
PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 276 (1989).
34. See MARTHA FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF
DIVORCE REFORM 36-52 (1991); Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions,
Questioning the Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Reform, in DIVORCE REFORM AT
THE CROSSROADS 191, 200 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds. 1990); LENORE
WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 106-07 (1985).
35. For the opposing view of the liberal feminist, which ignores the exploitation
inherent in the practice of surrogacy, see Marjorie M. Schultz, Reproductive Technology
and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV.
297, 302-03 (defending the enforcement of surrogacy agreements and insisting specific
enforcement respects the expressed intent of both parties).
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Similarly, as soon as a woman is classified as unmarried, she
becomes entitled to compensation for only her household labor
in a dispute with a former lover. Students "correctly" distort a
woman's experience of a long-term, intimate, and loving relation-
ship and perceive it as a discrete bargain exchange. By accepting
the law's refusal to acknowledge the validity of the relationship
as a marriage, my students absorb an ideology that reinforces
traditional definitions of family and the existing ordering of social
relationships. Families composed of single mothers with children
and single-sex relationships are delegitimized as well. If I include
another issue, that the woman has committed a fraud, I contribute
to the stereotypical notion of women as deceivers of men who
cannot be trusted to keep their word. If, however, the facts
emphasize the exploitative nature of the surrogacy agreement or
suggest that the male lover has lied and has failed to abide by
his promise of marriage, I open myself to the criticism of bias. I
then would be accused of politicizing the course. Apparently,
neutrality means the woman is at fault. In the end, treating men
and women the same amounts to perpetuating contract's funda-
mentally male perspective, failing to capture many women's ex-
periential understanding of pregnancy, family, and personal
relationships.
Furthermore, the liberal feminist view does not question the
legal classification system itself, which is defined and ordered by
privileged social groups. Certain rules in contract law are estab-
lished as normative, whereas the claims of disfavored social
groups who question the rules are treated as threatening excep-
tions to the natural social ordering. The social world of contract
reflects existing hierarchies; it is comprised for the most part of
employers and professional merchants (usually white men) oppos-
ing employees and less knowledgeable consumer/victims (at times
women, blacks, and other outsider groups).36 Liberal feminism
does not, however, challenge the power dynamics implicated in
36. Mary Joe Frug observed that a contracts casebook furthers gender stereotypes
by illustrating the doctrine of mutual assent with examples from the commercial sphere
where we presume men predominate, and illustrating the softer, less-important doctrine
of detrimental reliance with examples from personal social relationships where women
have traditionally been confined. Mary Joe Frug, Rereading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis
of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 1065, 1092 (1985).
Patricia Williams comments that, ironically, those who successfully defend against a
claim of contract are typically the old, the poor, women, and blacks. See PATRICIA J.
WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: THE DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR 155-56
(1991).
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commercial relationships or the ways case analysis forecloses the
possibility of change. 37
For example, in classifying employment contract cases, stu-
dents must discredit an employee's claim of contract breach as
well as her perspective on her work environment and reconstitute
her story as just another illustration of, or an exception to, the
employee-at-will doctrine. That is how such cases are usually
described in a student's contracts outline. Whether the employee
wins or loses, what counts and becomes a natural law is the
employer's right to fire employees.38 The rule reconfigures the
employee's life and at the same time indoctrinates a student to
believe that relatively little can be changed. The employee main-
tains the burden of proving to the class that she falls into one
of the limited exceptions. Thus, a predetermined thought struc-
ture takes control, shaping the reader as well as the issue and
curtailing an understanding of more important underlying dis-
criminatory social practices that should be revealed.
Traditional case analysis does not lend itself to the identifica-
tion of systemic inequalities. It enthrones the hierarchical struc-
ture of work in our society3 9 and minimizes the pervasiveness of
37. For example, in my recent contracts exam I presented my students with a
paradigmatic adoption scenario. A young single mother without sufficient means to provide
for her daughter Jessica enters into an adoption agreement with a childless couple, the
DeBoers. Subsequently, when she marries and feels more secure about her future, she
changes her mind. Asked to represent the biological mother, students attempt in vain to
find an appropriate defense to the agreement. An adoption contract is not intrinsically
unconscionable, fraudulent, unduly influenced, or the product of an unsound mind. Yet
nothing but the most severe socioeconomic hardships, as well as the stigma attached to
being a single mother, would compel most women to make such a choice in the first
place.
38. See, e.g., Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (1984) (holding an
employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge only if the employee has given
separate consideration, the employer has promised specific treatment in an employee
handbook, or has violated a clear mandate of public policy in firing the employee). Marnie
Mahoney writes that the walls of the workplace are papered with employee's rights.
Sexual harassment policies, minimum wage rules, and authorized work hours are promi-
nently displayed. The power of the employer over the employee, however, need not be
posted:
This place can close at any time. We could be gone with minimal warning
to you, and you can't stop us.
I can fire you any time I want. I don't even need a reason.
If I do fire you, it will be up you to prove it was not your fault.
Otherwise, you can't even get any unemployment insurance benefits.
Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Power and the Idea of Leaving in Love, Work, and the
Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1296 (1992).
39. See, e.g., Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical
Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369, 373 (1982-
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abusive treatment,40 including sexual harassment.4' By adhering
to the legal classification scheme, students absorb the status quo.
As a result, students discount the primary claim of outsiders-
that the legal system inadequately responds to inequality and
oppression. Accordingly, assimilating outsiders into the tradition
does not include them in the very interstices of the law itself.
Rather, they are subsumed within the law's biased structural
system. Once an outsider has vanished within the classification,
it becomes more difficult for students to realize that the outsider
perspective is not really there. Indeed, a student can become so
steeped in grouping cases under the heading of one fundamental
contract principle, that she is disabled from writing a persuasive
argument.
This problem was brought home to me in my first year of
teaching contracts. A student was experiencing great difficulty
in writing an appellate brief. When she asked me for help, she
told me she saw no point in reading cases in most of her first
year classes because the rules were already there. Cases were
merely anecdotal illustrations of the existing doctrine. I asked
her to explain the authoritative source of the rules and she
mechanically repeated what she had been taught-case law.
Something was seriously wrong. She was oblivious to the manip-
ulation of the rules and facts in case law-that lawmakers assume
only certain rules apply and that they interpret doctrine in
different ways, using conflicting arguments. Only after prolonged
discussion was I able to pinpoint her confusion. She had so
internalized the classification system as an objective depiction of
reality that she was prevented from critically reading opinions.
83) (suggesting that legal reasoning is an ideological form of thought, presupposing and
legitimating the existing hierarchy of social relationships, such as landlordltenant, and
employerworker).
40. See, e.g., Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1988) (accusing tort
law of condoning and supporting the emotional abuse of minority and female employees
who are in the lowest socioeconomic tier of the labor force and must endure abusive
mistreatment by supervisors).
41. The availability of a legal remedy as an exception to the employee-at-will doctrine
does not necessarily alter the power relationship between employer and employee, or
men and women. See Mahoney, supra note 38, at 1289-98 (explaining that leaving one's
job or suing one's employer because of sexual harassment are unrealistic options for
many women employees .who are unable to obtain equivalent work and fear reprisals if
they dare speak out); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of
Interest Argument, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1749, 1833-36 (1990) (describing the hostility and
resistance to the presence of women in the workplace).
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She had cabined her mind in her efforts to catalogue cases. I
found the best way to help this student was to challenge her
habit of organization. I asked her to find ways in which the cases
were inconsistent and unpersuasive. Deconstruction, not the con-
struction of legal categories, enabled her to comprehend the
dynamic nature of law and to begin to think like a lawyer.
III. THE CARING PROPOSAL
The third approach to diversity, the caring proposal, is more
subversive. A contract is recast into a personal relationship
between mutually interdependent parties who should respond to
each other's interests. This proposal has the advantage of signif-
icantly broadening contract law's subject matter to include issues
that are of special interest to women. In effect, contracts is
combined with family law. The methodology is closely associated
with cultural feminism, that ethical principles of caring and
responsibility are more important than minimalist contractual
obligations or individualistic personal rights.42 Duncan Kennedy's
groundbreaking work on contract law,43 as well as the writings
of Ian MacNeil similarly reinvent contract analysis." Students
learn to question the underlying valueg of the bargain exchange
rules, to reconceptualize contract as a long-term ongoing rela-
tionship, and to consider a contracting party's social responsibility
instead of just his or her interest in market maximization.
Emphasizing agreements in the family, however, such as mar-
ital and adoption contracts, and surrogacy and cohabitation agree-
ments, can suggest that women should be excluded from
commercial transactions altogether. Cultural feminism's ethic of
care insinuates that women are imbued with special nurturing
qualities and that gender differences are innate, thereby perpet-
uating separate spheres. Existing social arrangements in which
women assume the double burden of housework and a job outside
the home appear to have been created by inborn gender-specific
42. See supra note 27.
43. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1685, 1717-22 (1976) (noting the ambiguity in contract theory, reflecting inconsistent
visions of a world of free individualists and a world of social beings who must take into
account the interests of others).
44. See IAN R. MAcNEIL. THE NEw SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 10-35 (1980 (discussing the differences between a theory of
contract as a discrete transaction and a relational contract, in which values other than
an increase in wealth play a role).
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traits. Additionally, students view one-sided marital dissolution
agreements, surrogacy and cohabitation contracts (typical situa-
tions in which women exercise little bargaining power), as well
as discriminatory treatment in the workplace as not requiring
legal intervention because those situations are the expressions
of women's altruistic nature or the "natural" consequences of
womanhood. 4 If I help students to understand that women need
the law to recognize the value of their caring,46 they can still
assume that separate spheres are a part of the natural order,
instead of the social invention of patriarchy. Moreover, the nur-
turing ethic of cultural feminism tends to be associated with the
values of middle-class white women. For example, in a recent
case a black gestational surrogate, who argued she had bonded
with the non-black child she carried and that the mother/child
relationship outweighed her contractual obligation, was denied
custody.47 As a black woman on welfare, her maternal caregiving
ability was devalued.
Critical contract theory, emphasizing communal standards of
trust and responsibility, is also problematic. For example, in
discussing unconscionability, despite good intentions, professors
can portray outsiders as perpetual helpless victims denied of all
agency who are not quite smart enough to protect themselves.
48
45. For a truly frightening example, see EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp.
1264 (N.D. 11. 1986), affd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding Sears did not discriminate
in failing to promote female employees who "naturally" prefer to care for their families
rather than secure time-consuming and higher-paying jobs). Joan Williams claims that
cultural feminism is responsible for the result in Sears. She believes the ethic of care
harms women by disguising the unfair wage-labor system and the unequal burden on
women who maintain dual working roles at home and on the job. A woman's "choice" to
sacrifice career success is cloaked in virtue instead of being exposed as gender discrim-
ination. Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 814-15, 831 (1989).
46. See Beverly Horsburgh, Redefining the Family: Recognizing the Altruistic Caretaker
and the Importance of Relational Needs, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 423, 453, 497 (1992) (proposing
that women who are in informal relationships and women who are formally married be
awarded permanent support when their relationships end, in recognition of not just their
housework, but also their value system).
47. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 206, and cert.
dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 374 (1993). For a criticism, see Beverly Horsburgh, Jewish Women,
Black Women: Guarding Against the Oppression of Surrogacy, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J.
29, 45-46 (1993) (arguing cultural feminism's claim that surrogates are entitled to custody,
on grounds they bond with the children they carry, does not help a black gestational
surrogate because the bonding experience of a black woman who is genetically unrelated
to the child is not believed and a black woman's mothering skills are not valued).
48. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract
and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power,
41 MD. L. REv. 563 (1982) (insisting that a more empathetic standard is needed in contract
law and that paternalistic motives are pervasive in the traditional doctrine).
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In addition, white students may stereotype all blacks as welfare
recipients, likely to be involved in Walker-Thomas'9-type dealings.
They may not be made aware of the black middle class. Important
differences among individuals in a minority group could be ne-
glected. Conversely, if I ignore race in discussing Walker-Thomas,
I do not educate my students on the social and historical context
that informs the court's opinion. I have found many students do
not realize the plaintiff is black in Walker-Thomas and few know
much about the civil rights movement. In reading the case, they
do not consider its background-that as late as the 1950s, Jim
Crow laws prohibited African Americans from exercising free
choice in the marketplace. I need to bring race into the class
discussion in order for students to see Walker-Thomas as a civil
rights case, a part of the struggle of African Americans to secure
access to public goods and services but, at the same time, I need
to find ways to ensure I avoid stereotyping.
I have also found that critical contract theory's methodology,
deconstructing legal analysis to reveal its underlying indetermi-
nacy,60 does not in itself suggest the importance of focusing on
one's own personal life. Because students have been indoctrinated
to accept liberalism's construction of reality and to interpret the
experiences of others from a privileged vantage point, I need to
entice them to trust the personal. I try to create an atmosphere
in which students are willing to ground themselves in their
situations, and from that context, reconstruct a legitimate reality
informed by their own knowledge of social life. By viewing the
situation from their personal vantage point the students will be
better able to perceive the incoherence in the liberal vision.
For instance, in discussing unconscionability and contracts in
the family setting, I want the class to look at their own experi-
ences and realize that we are not always obsessed with the need
to control government, despite the prominence of this issue in
liberal theory. Power does not blow in from only one direction,
like a strong prevailing northeastern wind, but comes at us from
many regions, permeating our everyday lives. Some students are
only too aware of the misuse of government power. A black
student will reveal that he has felt the full brunt of the police
power in his community, singled out for constant surveillance.
49. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding
unconscionable an installment sales contract in which each item purchased became security
for all other items sold to the buyer).
50. See supra note 11 for an analysis of critical legal theory.
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Yet in other circumstances the presence of the police is sorely
missed. Many students are willing to confess their preoccupation
with the faculty's power to assign the grades that will play such
a determinative role in their career opportunities. They also
mention the authority of law school deans, the influence of peer
pressure, and problems with parents or spouses as ongoing con-
flicts in their personal lives. I confide I also experience power
issues in my life. My family responsibilities, the administration,
tenured faculty members, and students exercise control over me.
Student/faculty evaluations and a law review's decision on pub-
lishing are important salient factors in my promotion.
Although there are benefits in these exchanges about the
variety of power conflicts in our daily lives, liberalism's notion
that the state is the exclusive enemy of freedom is ingrained,
pulling on the mind of the class. Students continue to lose sight
of their own awareness that power. relationships exist in private
social settings, as well as in the public context. Even if they are
cognizant of power sources other than the state, they neverthe-
less cannot connect the liberal theory with their lives and note
that there is a disparity. Students have been trained not to
question presupposed theoretical constructs, even if they fail to
match up with reality. Abstraction has become true because
students are tutored to trust liberal theory more than their own
perceptions in discerning the truth. They also are not repeatedly
shown in the classroom that the answer does not lie in merely
controlling government, but that oppressive social relationships
also require a response from the state.
The artificial compartmentalization of private law from public
law has other negative effects. This approach also isolates stu-
dents from seeing that the state is implicated in private decision
making and that contracts is a matter of public law. Course
divisions make it more difficult for them to comprehend that the
state is always present, influencing choices by empowering some
and weakening others.
Merely discrediting and deconstructing authoritative textual
readings, however, does not suggest to students that they should
trust their own experiences and risk sharing them with each
other. They are deprived of enriching themselves by really lis-
tening to diverse experiences and accepting their authenticity.
Unless they are encouraged to have faith in the personal account,
it is not possible to probe beneath the thick layering of socially
constructed images in liberalism and fathom the many power
relationships that shape our lives.
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IV. THE RADICAL PROPOSAL
In contrast to the liberal view, the radical feminist proposal
directly attacks the private/public distinction and presents agree-
ments in the family and in the market as part of an overarching
social order in which women are dominated by men.51 Combining
contracts with family law in this manner can aid in dispelling
idealistic illusions of a private area of life unsullied by power
relationships or financial bargaining. Women's work in the home
could be rendered visible to students once they are encouraged
to see the family as an economic institution. On the other hand,
representing contracts as the systematic subordination of women
is also a privileged and partial perspective. Marital agreements
and cohabitation contracts appear to be the concerns primarily
of white women who press claims against relatively affluent white
men. I essentialize all women by narrowly constructing contracts
around white women's experiences, ignoring other institutional
forces such as race and class. I also reinforce the tendency to
see gender bias from the perspective of well-paid professional
women. Radical feminism in contracts, just like liberal feminism,
can take on elitist overtones. For example, in discussing compen-
sation for housework, some women students attempt to show the
male students that men devalue women's work by pointing out
how expensive it is to hire a maid.
Students also could assume that traditional women are only
unenlightened passive victims of powerful social forces, thereby
denying many women the dignity of knowing their own minds.52
I could present a picture of women that fails to reflect their
complex experiences and various responses to oppression, de-
51. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
327 (1989) (arguing that traditional social institutions are patriarchal and that liberal
theory masks the reality of women's oppression by enforcing the male point of view);
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281
(1991) (claiming that a model of equality based on women's sameness with men or
difference from men is unable to challenge the systematic social construction of women
as inferior to men).
52. Radical feminism's claim that women are oppressed victims who at times contribute
to their own domination by internalizing the dominant culture's depiction of women
alienates many women who see themselves as autonomous decisionmakers. It also fails
to recognize that women's choices are often not easily made. A woman's decision to take
on primary responsibility for home and children can result from her lack of success in
convincing her spouse to agree to a more equitable arrangement. See Kathryn Abrams,
Ideology & Women's Choices, 24 GA. L. REV. 761, 782, 789, 798 (1990) (criticizing feminist
theories based on ideological determinism and suggesting that narratives are better able
to convey the subtle, multi-causal factors influencing women's choices).
OPENING THE CONTRACTS DISCOURSE
picting them as irrational and weak, as does the patriarchal
description of women that all feminists deplore. Moreover, be-
cause we encourage the preservation of hierarchy, students may
decide that a court should not reward a woman for maintaining
a conventional life style. Overall, I may not be sensitive to many
women; I could deny the experiences of many outsiders by
overlooking oppressive social practices other than gender and
could unintentionally lead the class to believe that helping women
achieve equality means ignoring the traditional woman's values
and economic plight.0
Radical feminism, however, also has the potential to surpass
its seemingly limited, unidimensional focus on institutionalized
gender bias. For example, after a heated class debate over the
court's decision in Walker-Thomas,5 I ask the class the following
questions: Why do many students believe the buyer is fully
informed and not the victim of an unfair surprise? Conversely,
why does the law presume the buyer of abortion services is not
fully informed and must be given additional time and additional
information?5 If the purchase of the goods in the unconscionable
contract seems ill-considered, surely it is a less-informed choice
than abortion, which is a serious matter and less likely to be a
frivolous decision. Can we read the buyers' minds? This leads us
into a comparison of the negative images of women and the poor
in case law, calling into question the social attitudes that govern
decision making. Looking at the contradictory assumptions re-
garding whether there has been an exercise of meaningful choice
heightens awareness of the ways those in power tend to depre-
ciate the problems of disadvantaged social groups and to resort
to negative stereotyping. Accordingly, understanding patriarchal
53. Although I agree with Joan Williams that the ethic of care harms women in
general by marginalizing them in the workforce and reinforcing genderized social roles,
an individual woman, nevertheless, should not be denied compensation for her domestic
work and traditional values out of fear that remuneration will encourage the continuation
of an unequal wage-labor system. It is not helpful for a lawyer to tell a woman she has
been deceived and would have been better off if she had spent more time in the workforce
when she needs someone to champion her interests at the time of divorce. She depends
on her lawyer to argue that her contributions in the home are valuable. See Peter
Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected. A Civic
Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 695 (1994)
(suggesting that a lawyer needs to be open to the client's values, even if they are at
odds with one's own).
54. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
55. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)
(holding it is not an undue burden to require a woman to wait 24 hours before having
an abortion).
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social images can pave the way to understanding other kinds of
negative social imprinting perpetuated in the law.
V. THE MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVE PROPOSAL
The last proposal to include minorities, the multiple perspective
proposal, is more eclectic. I use narratives and articles by critical
race scholars with the hope that students will transcend their
own particular outlook and reappraise contract issues from the
standpoint of the oppressed.6 I also include more traditional
scholarship and socioeconomic studies, noting the effects of class,
race, and gender on bargaining power. Personal accounts of
racism refute notions that all blacks are on welfare and reveal
the widespread antipathy encountered by African Americans of
all income classes in buying goods. 7 Narratives open the class to
the human dimension and exert a sympathetic pull on the stu-
dents' emotions. Critical race scholars expose the depth and
breadth of prejudice, pointing out that the negative images of
outsiders exist in popular culture, although they are often not
immediately recognized as racist expressions.5 In addition, stud-
ies that prove the price of a new car is set higher for women
and for black men,6 9 or that document how the doctrine of
unconscionability has not benefitted the urban poor,60 illuminate
the class-based, sexist, and racist power structures conditioning
negotiations in the marketplace. As a result of reading these
56. Judy Scales-Trent explains this teaching method as helping others who are not
outsiders to see the ways we are all the same as well as the ways we are different.
To the extent that students who are not Asian-American can see this society
through the eyes of an Asian-American ... to the extent that a student who
is not gay can see the world through the eyes of a gay person ... to this
extent will they be less able to engage in the oppression that harms so
many.
In order to get to this point, the students have to see themselves at the
crossroads. They have to see not only the differences between themselves
and others, but they have to see the sameness also.
Judy Scales-Trent, Sameness and Difference in a Law School Classroom: Working at the
Crossroads, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 415, 417 (1992).
57. See WILLIAMS, supra note 36, at 44-51.
58. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law
and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258,
1262-79 (1992).
59. See Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car
Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 818-19 (1991).
60. See Stewart Macaulay, Bambi Meets Godzilla: Reflections on Contracts Scholarship
and Teaching vs. State Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection
Statutes, 26 Hous. L. REV. 575, 586-87, 595-98 (1989).
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materials, students could become less prone to stereotyping and
more skeptical of the freedom of contract rhetoric, which is
oblivious to racism and sexism, in the case law. At least in
theory, students are enabled to see past the empty formalism of
what passes as purportedly consensual decision making. They
also are sensitized to others who are different from themselves
and better educated concerning minority problems. The presence
of these writings in the syllabus, furthermore, affirms the con-
cerns of minority students in the class.
Although many students are emotionally touched by the elo-
quence of these writers and I may avoid the problem of essen-
tialism by adding these materials to a syllabus, locating relevant
sources is a heavy burden, especially for professors who, like me,
teach in small schools with limited resources. Outsider perspec-
tives tend to be shunted aside in a traditional library's acquisition
plan. Moreover, when I am able to find an appropriate article in
one of the few law journals receptive to new ideas, I realize
many students are reluctant to read past case assignments. Even
if I were better able to inspire my students to appreciate the
importance of reading more than the usual casebook, I am not
convinced that a politic of the personal resonates for the majority
of students or that many grasp its legal implications. Relatively
few in the class seem to understand the significance of a narrative
and how it relates to the traditional contracts discourse. In fact,
I have found that students tend to interpret the more creative
and subjective writings as irrelevant to rules of law.
Because students have been taught to devalue subjective de-
scriptions of personal experience in favor of abstract legal clas-
sifications, they disregard highly personalized writings and the
ideas of many nontraditional scholars, not realizing the authors
intend to expose the law's partial and biased outlook. As a result,
students lose more than just the benefit of understanding out-
sider perspectives. They are also deprived of the help and guid-
ance that nontraditional scholarship provides in coming to terms
with the traditional discourse. They fail to realize that some of
their struggles and frustrations are due to the incoherent and
subjective nature of the concepts and categories of contract law.61
61. Clare Dalton's article exposing the underlying indeterminacy in contract analysis
could be helpful to first-year students. Dalton validates a student's tendency to apply
detrimental reliance to a fact pattern instead of consideration and suggests that the
student's analysis is more accurate than the law's preference for consideration. See Dalton,
supra note 22, at 1090.
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At the very least, if students read these materials, they would
be less prone to blame themselves for their lack of "common
sense."
Students are also impressed by the power of law and many
seem to reprocess their own experiences according to the tradi-
tional rhetoric of rights analysis and notions of formal equality,
rather than associate themselves with the disturbing revelations
present in less traditional scholarship. Some find it difficult to
identify with, or hesitate to see themselves in, the narrative or
the socioeconomic study. Most white students seem to believe
the struggle against white supremacy is over and many male and
female students assume sexism is a thing of the past. If we have
not personally experienced bias, it is easy to believe that we are
all equal now. Even raising these topics unsettles students, caus-
ing a hostile reaction. Consequently, the steadfast grip of a
student's personal belief system can overwhelm the subjective
minority account, rendering it trivial, anecdotal, and nonrepre-
sentative.
Many students, moreover, resist discovering that outsiders are
excluded from the discourse, not realizing that the processing of
traditional analysis has immunized them from recognizing the
bias in the doctrine. A student who has been drawn into the
"Cult of Objectivity" wants to remain a member in good standing
of the dominant social group.
In assimilating legal reasoning, a student also can be personally
subsumed, enveloped by concepts that demand she reinvent her-
self. She can become malleable, learning to distance herself from
her own identity and the problems of outsiders as well. Once a
student is submerged in law, criticisms of the existing discourse
can be interpreted as an attack on the student herself. A student's
self-worth can become caught up in her ability to ingest doctrine
and prove she has digested it in class and on an exam. Even if
the law also has taught her to belittle herself, ignore abuse and
oppression, and accept a humiliating judgment imposed by others,
her need to stay with what she has learned, rather than chance
the unknown, can cause her to refuse the very thoughts and
insights that would free her to create her own identity.
In the law school setting, social issues are introduced that
students may have personally experienced, previously thought
about, or never considered at all. No matter what the student's
degree of preparation, the law exerts intense pressure on an
individual student to conform to the dictates of the dominant
culture's picture of human behavior. She is obliged to transform
[Vol. 1:57
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herself to meet a standard presented as universal, and stifle
aspects of her personality at odds with the dominant viewpoint.62
A student has little choice but to imbibe the legal culture's
ethnocentric outlook as representative of all outlooks, including
her own self as the subject matter of another's outlook in the
process.6 The cumulative effect of learning law is that the student
adapts herself to respond to the social world according to the
law's particularized demands. A student's self-identity is inevi-
tably influenced and, if needed, altered. The process can be
psychologically self-destructive.
Although some students resist conforming and many glimpse
the biased nature of the law, without the opportunity to focus
on outsider issues and discuss one's personal response to the
doctrine, it is easy to swallow indignities reflexively. Critical self-
conscious awareness of the law's effect upon oneself requires
time for thought and discussion. The typical law school program
allots little time to this end. Furthermore, unless sufficient space
and time is made for outsider perspectives, the pressure to learn
the tradition can insulate many students from receiving ideas
that could provide them with needed emotional support.64
The classroom's hierarchical socratic format, an epistemology
grounded in the belief that students can find knowledge if their
teachers guide them through the rigorous demands of doctrinal
62. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3, 22-23 (1988) (arguing that changing the reasonable man standard to the reasonable
person does not alter the predominately male perspective of reasonableness). The rea-
sonable woman standard is equally problematic, rewarding only virtuous women who
conform to traditional societal expectations. See Naomi Cahn, The Looseness of Legal
Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1398, 1415-16 (1992).
63. See Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Foreword Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy
in Legal Education, 11 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1, 4 (1989) (stating the objective perspective of
the classroom requires a minority student to "look back at herself to determine whether
her own presence in a white neighborhood would be sufficient cause for her to arrest
herself").
64. For instance, a student's loss of confidence due to low grades could influence the
rest of her life, interfering with her bar exam preparation and her relationships with
colleagues and clients. Although many law schools offer tutoring programs and institute
other helpful services designed to ensure "high risk" students survive, little is imple-
mented to convince students to believe in their ability. Instead, the tradition is reinforced
by remedial measures, exacerbating feelings of low self-esteem.
In order for these students to tackle their studies with confidence, they need more
nontraditional perspectives, not just repetitions of the standard curriculum. Although a
fresh approach, sensitive to outsider problems, could build assurance in their lawyering
ability, they are less in a position to hear the voices of outsider scholars, oftentimes
similar to their own, because they must be doubly dedicated to the traditional discourse.
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analysis, is more often mystifying rather than enlightening. Be-
cause the process is arbitrary and subjective, it creates pressure
on students.65 Any minimal gain in comprehension can be an
exhaustive ordeal. Consequently, if I suggest that a court's refusal
to enforce a cohabitation agreement and its willingness to uphold
a surrogacy agreement are expressions of biased and subjective
cultural values, I could threaten a student's hold on an under-
standing of the law she initially struggled so hard to obtain. The
notion that the law is not objective topples an entire thought
structure the student justifiably takes pride in having mastered.
Furthermore, I attack the standardization process of law school
itself, more than just a given rule of law. A student at this point
is likely to resist, not welcome, the suggestion, since she has
invested considerable emotional and intellectual efforts in adapt-
ing herself to fit within the confines of the cultural paradigm.
Her tentative confidence in herself to become a lawyer is at
stake.
Hence, the difficulty students experience in processing inter-
pretive constructs that are eventually internalized as objective
truths tends to encyst them against being receptive to new ideas.
The nontraditionalist professor appears to be engaging in an
unnecessary egocentric as well as politically motivated departure
from unfiltered rules of law; law that the student now accepts
as unconnected to a particular social group's politics. Outsider
perspectives that are intended to reveal the politics of the ma-
jority are reduced to politicized exceptions. Minority concerns
become, at best, minor additions to, or at worst, suspicious
deviations from, a predesigned text. This result is unfortunate
for all students, but for women students it is particularly coun-
terproductive. Some women appear to be less aware of gender
bias than black students are of racism, and for that reason are
more likely to cling to the tradition and reject feminist analysis.
65. See Kennedy, supra note 21, at 40 (stating that the classroom arrangement in a
law school suggests both "the patriarchal family and a Kafkalike riddle state"); see also
Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 1547, 1554-55 (1993) (arguing that the socratic method promotes authoritarian
relationships as well as competition instead of cooperation, fails to value the emotional
side of interpersonal relationships, and rejects the importance of ethical issues); Susan
H. Williams, Legal Education, Feminist Epistemology, and the Socratic Method, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 1571, 1574-75 (1993) (criticizing the socratic method for assuming knowledge is
something to be found and is possessed by the professor rather than being the result of
an exchange between the professor and the student that creates knowledge of which
neither was aware beforehand).
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Yet a diverse perspective may be exactly what these women
need the most in order to feel better about themselves.66
In addition, the voice of the oppressed at times has found
refuge and strength in hate speech. Some who claim to speak
for a minority express misogyny, racism, homophobia, or antise-
mitism,6 7 discrediting the value of more sensitive minority per-
spectives. Scholars who should become familiar to students are
thereby discounted.
A contracts syllabus, to be truly representative, should also
reveal the ways a minority can oppress its own members. For
instance, as a Jewish feminist, I am aware that Jewish Orthodox
husbands routinely exact economic concessions from their wives
in divorce settlement agreements by threatening to withhold the
"get" (the Jewish divorce), a power unilaterally granted to men
by Jewish law.68 Because no group of people is immune from
prejudice or exploitative tactics, oppression within a social group
as well as the divisions between groups should be exposed to
the class.
In summary, including outsiders in the traditional discipline
can lead to distortion and rebound against good faith efforts,
conveying a different impression from that which was intended.
Professors may inadvertently make minorities the victims of their
own inclusion project.
On the other hand, inevitably there are flaws in any noncon-
ventional theoretical perspective. Given that traditional legal
analysis and formalist liberal theory were not designed to meet
the needs of outsiders who played no role in their development,
any new jurisprudence faces the daunting task of expanding or
reinventing analysis without inventing a new Cult, and, at the
66. Although I have seen how an understanding of feminism instills confidence, self-
pride, and a sense of dignity, women law students resist feminism for many complex
reasons. For one thing, it is dangerous to be defiantly female in a hostile environment
in which male values reign supreme. See Deborah Waire Post, Reflections on Identity,
Diversity and Morality, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 136, 141 (1991) (noting the author
discovered gender bias in law school and exclaiming how easy it is for women law
students to internalize a value system that teaches them to hate themselves and other
women).
67. For an article commenting on the need to air prejudice and resolve differences
within and between social groups, see Horsburgh, supra note 47, at 59 & n.112, 60 &
n.118, 61 n.119. For a contrasting view, suggesting blacks should not be quick to condemn
antisemitism and sexism within the black community, see BELL, supra note 8, at 117-22.
68. See, e.g., Perl v. Perl, 512 N.Y.S.2d 372 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); Irving Breitowitz,
The Plight of the Agunah: A Study in Halacha, Contract, and the First Amendment, 51
MD. L. REv. 312 (1992); Marc Feldman, Jewish Women and Secular Courts: Helping a
Jewish Woman Obtain a Get, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 139 (1990).
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same time, revealing a small part of the numerous ways in which
a minority is excluded and misunderstood. No megatheory or
unique vision is able to capture and resolve all of the issues
facing outsiders in an imperfect world beset with serious socio-
economic inequalities and prejudice. Scholars have learned to
seek flexible and pragmatic solutions that are tailored to the
context of the particular situation, 9 to live with contradictions,70
and to eschew dogmatic approaches. 71
For this reason, including outsiders and their various ap-
proaches to law in contracts necessarily results in a mix of
conflicting as well as limited proposals. If I convey to students
a sense of the magnitude of social ills to be addressed, they need
not be led to assume that any legal theory can be reduced to a
formula, providing obvious answers that are instantly ascertain-
able and relevant to all that ails us. Additionally, some of the
difficulties encountered in introducing outsider issues can be
candidly dealt with in the classroom. If classical case law may
offend a particular outsider group, other cases can be found or
the case can serve to expose the narrowness and bias in the
tradition. Furthermore, opening class discussion to a criticism of
one's attempts to include minorities actually helps to sensitize
students. For example, the tendency to privilege middle-class
white interests or to stereotype or objectify outsiders can be
counteracted, to some extent, by simply making students aware
of the problem and admitting that, at times, we are all guilty of
this mistake. Also, as a white woman, I have more confidence in
my teaching of women's issues than my ability to communicate
the black community's concerns. I need to be open with my
students about my own qualifications as well. Professors can
share the good and the bad with students: the wonderful insights
that scholarship can provide, our frustrations with our own lim-
itations, and the shortcomings in case law or legal theory. More
importantly, the drawbacks in nontraditional jurisprudence are
not responsible for all the discouragements that a professor
experiences in opening a course to diversity.
I suspect that bigotry lingers on, an intransigent feature of
our culture, despite efforts to diversify. The hatred expressed in
69. See Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597,
1599, 1610, 1614-15 (1990).
70. See Radin, supra note 10, at 1700-04.
71. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324-26, 338-41 (1987).
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my classroom has reminded me that we all have been raised to
be racist and sexist deep down. Outsiders cannot truly be included
in the context of the discourse in any course as long as the
overall social world of a law school remains hostile to individual
differences.
Prejudice against outsiders and outsider perspectives are art-
fully expressed. One way is for a school to depreciate the worth
of courses taught by professors who are known to be interested
in outsider issues. Another way is to guide students to select
certain courses by maintaining requirements and by scheduling
disfavored courses or professors at an inconvenient time. One
popular way is to devalue the importance of teaching jurispru-
dence and writing theoretical law review articles, presenting
these pursuits as largely irrelevant to the practice of law.72
Because of prejudice, students who resist conforming to the
homogeneous model find they must withstand intense social pres-
sure from their mentors, the faculty, and their peers. Nonconfor-
mists risk disapproval, intimidation, and the hostility of professors
and other students just by being receptive to outsider perspec-
tives. It is an act of courage to sign up for certain electives, such
as AIDS and the Law, a seminar on women's issues or civil
rights, or labor law taught by a critical legal studies scholar. As
long as nontraditional students incur suspicion and disfavor by
faculty and other students, undermining their ability to express
their preferences, the inclusion project is less than completely
successful.
Yet another subtle form of prejudice is to persistently ignore
the raised hands of women in the classroom or to interrupt the
women midstream, in order to hear what the men have to say,
notwithstanding the women's perfectly acceptable responses. One
last form of prejudice causes the most harm. Outsider students
are compelled to hear painful and cruel descriptions of themselves
and their behavior in traditional courses. To oppose the majority
requires a degree of courage that no student should shoulder
without the support of the school. The following incident illus-
trates what I mean.
Last year a professor at my school invited a prominent attorney
to speak to the class concerning his strategy as defense attorney
72. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 50, 62 (1992) (urging law schools to hire
more practice-minded professors to ensure that the teaching and the scholarship of a
faculty concentrate on doctrinal analysis).
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in a highly publicized rape case. Although many stereotypical,
vicious, and uninformed comments regarding women and date
rape were "jokingly" expressed by the lawyer and some of the
male students, none of the women in the class felt free to
complain. Some internalized the portrayal of women as an accu-
rate description of themselves, not realizing they were reinforcing
their lack of self-esteem. Some, aware they were being insulted,
cried silently to themselves. One woman, in frustration, wrote
each statement down on paper, hoping to discuss the remarks
more privately with her friends. Subsequently, the women came
to my office for sympathy and to ventilate their outrage. After
I passed around the Kleenex, I asked them why they hesitated
to speak out at the time the incident occurred. They told me
they did not know what to say. Although they felt offended, they
did not think it would be polite to criticize an expert practitioner
and were worried that they could also incur the anger of the
professor who was a friend of the guest lecturer. After all, the
expert was only "joking." If they overreacted, they would be
told they lacked a sense of humor. Most of all, they were con-
cerned with peer pressure. They feared the antagonism of their
classmates and social ostracism. The social costs of disagreeing
with the majoritarian culture's depiction of women inhibited their
need to defend themselves and other women.73
Note what we are teaching future lawyers. Although the law-
yer's jokes seem asides, a warm-up to the more serious discussion
on effective representation, they convey a seductive message. As
an expert who represents the very image of professionalism, his
jokes are not harmless or neutral distractions, separate from his
more serious lecture. Ostensibly neutral trial techniques embody
prejudice against outsiders. A successful rape defense requires
negative stereotyping of the victim, drawing on the fact-finder's
fear and hatred of women. Misogyny is inscribed in effective
advocacy. Thus, the woman-hating expressed by the expert was
not a joke. Rather, it was the core content of his lecture, his
very prescription of good lawyering.
In addition, arguing against the grain and representing what
one believes to be true is not fostered in a law school if students
73. Studies indicate that women law students speak less in class because they are
intimidated by an environment that excludes and trivializes women. See, e.g., Taunya
Lovell Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 137 (1988); Stephanie M.
Wildman, The Question of Silence: Techniques to Ensure Full Class Participation, 38 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 147 (1988).
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fear the disapproval of the majority. How can students learn to
effectively represent women or a gay person in the armed forces
in this kind of atmosphere? My best guess is that the traditional
law school culture cultivates passivity and an unquestioning ac-
ceptance of those in authority. Ultimately, diversity in one course
is not much help to outsider students if in other courses they do
not feel free to courageously argue what is a matter of their
own self-respect. The laissez-faire approach of most law schools,
which assumes students are capable of becoming assertive with-
out institutional intervention, empowers the freedom of expres-
sion of the sexist "fraternity boys" in the quadrangle and
suppresses the voices of the timid and the embarrassed. 74 We
forget that a professor may be tempted to please the prevailing
sexist culture in the classroom because she will be well-rewarded
in her student evaluations. In defending. the remarks of the
outsider student, the professor takes what may be an unaccept-
able risk. Furthermore, a student pays later for what she has
said in class. In ignoring social pressure, by refusing to adopt
policies prohibiting sexual and racial harassment, or, at a bare
minimum, by refusing to emphasize the importance of sensitivity
to others, law schools allow serious emotional injuries to take
place. Outsider students and professors have every reason to feel
betrayed, depressed, and angry by what they experience in the
law school environment.
Moreover, even though including outsiders in the discourse is
not possible unless we are able to communicate meaningfully
with each other, and before we can converse we must be willing
to admit to our own prejudice, bigotry is the claim that is most
likely to be denied. I am therefore pessimistic about attempts to
diversify the curriculum. I do not suggest that professors abandon
the inclusion project. Nevertheless, without a willingness to be-
come more self-critical and sincerely confess our insensitivity,
tokenism may be all that can occur.
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, I believe law schools are required to do more to
confront their problems. They need to rethink their commitment
74. Similarly, Susan Estrich has argued that rape law punishes a woman by requiring
her to stand up and fight like a man and to react as if she is the bully in the schoolyard,
even though cultural attitudes regarding sexuality encourage male aggression and female
passivity. See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986).
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to those values that are appropriate to institutions responsible
for teaching the fundamentals of a democratic legal system.
Diversity entails a change in the legal culture's attitude and a
sweeping reform of the curriculum. A series of ongoing programs
designed to educate and sensitize the entire law school community
may prove fruitful. Otherwise, the efforts of professors to open
a course to diversity will continue to be seen as non-neutral
partisan politics, a mix of decent and indecent proposals. As long
as an entire law school curriculum is only occasionally tuned to
non-white, non-male concerns, law schools reproduce an all-white,
all-male oriented legal practice that only some professors con-
demn in the classroom as an indecent proposal. In the end, despite
the protestations of well-intended formalists, liberals, and radi-
cals, because of a three-year processing, we teach our students
that the status quo is really pretty decent after all.
